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Thematic review
Northern Ireland: where is the peace dividend?
Colin Knox, University of Ulster, cg.knox@ulster.ac.uk
Northern Ireland has been described as a ‘post conflict’ society with a stable political environment 
following the peace process, and yet it is a hugely segregated society with significant social 
deprivation. With peace came the promise of a ‘peace dividend’ for those most affected by the 
violence. This paper uses the Department for International Development’s (DFID) ‘state building 
for peace’ model as a way of understanding and analysing the fragility of the peace process, in 
particular how the Northern Ireland Executive, in order to maintain legitimacy and stability, has 
failed to meet public expectations to improve the quality of their lives.
key words: state building for peace • Northern Ireland • quality of life
Introduction
Northern Ireland has enjoyed a period of political stability from 2007 onwards and 
a significant decline in political violence. While regularly described as a post-conflict 
society, peace remains fragile not least because of legacy issues such as the highly 
segregated nature of Northern Ireland and lack of political consensus on how to deal 
with the past. There also remains an insidious undercurrent of dissident loyalist and 
republican activities preying on vulnerable communities where they exercise greatest 
influence. One issue promoted by negotiators in reaching a political settlement 
was the notion of a ‘peace dividend’, the likely consequence of which was a better 
quality of life for those most affected by the ‘troubles’. There were at least two 
elements to the prospect of a better future: attracting inward investment or economic 
reconstruction; and, a local devolved government using its resources to create a more 
equal society by targeting the most disadvantaged. The former was premised on the 
assumption that a peaceful Northern Ireland would attract international investment 
from companies which previously regarded it as too unstable for a business location. 
Typical of this international ‘open-for-business’ endorsement was New York Mayor, 
Michael Bloomberg, who addressed an investment conference in Belfast at which 
he highlighted American support in four key areas: infrastructure, small business 
development, tourism and private investment. He noted: ‘I would be willing to bet that 
a decade from now, the Dublin –London–Belfast triangle could be one of the largest 
and most competitive financial hubs in the world if the political situation continues to 
improve’, although he qualified his remarks with reference to demolition of the ‘peace’ 
walls (Bloomberg, 2008, 1). The devolved government has also directed its resources 
towards disadvantaged areas in an effort to deliver improvements in the quality of life 
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for those communities which are marginalised by poverty, social exclusion and the 
legacy of conflict but thus far has been unable to strengthen state–society relations.
State building for peace
In broad terms a twin track methodology has been adopted to peace building in 
Northern Ireland: structural and behaviourial approaches. In terms of the former, the 
aim was to secure political accommodation through the establishment of inclusive 
power sharing devolved institutions (McGarry and O’Leary, 2004) and put in place 
equality and human rights legislation which would guarantee fairness for the minority 
community (Dickson and Osborne, 2007). It is important to note, however, that 
devolution in itself was a necessary but insufficient prerequisite for peace building 
in Northern Ireland. As Morrow (2010, 12) argues, ‘devolution was a vital new 
beginning, holding out the possibility government might lead by symbol and action 
to a just, peaceful, secure and inclusive future. What it was not, was the totality of 
peace building’. The legacy of violence and division, not least a highly segregated 
society, remains unresolved. In terms of the behavourial approach to peace building, 
there is ongoing support for reconciliation through cross-community contact schemes 
which aim to reduce prejudice, increase tolerance and promote mutual understanding 
between the two main communities (Hughes et al, 2011). 
The international literature on peace building endorses these two approaches albeit 
with some limitations and refinements (see Moaz’s study (2011) on reconciliation work 
between Israeli Jews and Palestinians in the past 20 years). Wolff (2011), for example, 
argues that establishing consociational (power-sharing) institutions offers significant 
opportunities for building democratic states after conflict in divided societies. 
Hoogenboom and Vieille’s study (2010) on Bosnia stresses the importance of fostering 
reconciliation and recreating social trust as necessary elements for ensuring lasting 
peace. O’Brien’s comparative study (2007) of South Africa and Northern Ireland 
emphasises the need for people participation through a community development 
approach as a way of sustaining peace and reconciliation in post-settlement contexts.
There are also international lessons for peace building from the ongoing experience 
of post-conflict Northern Ireland. Rocha Menocal (2011) outlines the two leading 
approaches to promoting peace in conflict-afflicted fragile states as: (i) peace building 
defined as building ‘positive peace’, characterised by social harmony, respect for 
the rule of law and human rights and social and economic development (Galtung, 
1996); and (ii) state building or the state’s capacity, institutions and legitimacy, and 
the political and economic processes that underpin state–society relations (Fritz 
and Rocha Menocal, 2007). Rocha Menocal highlights the recent trend to conflate 
these two approaches into a new ‘state building for peace’ model endorsed by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2012). The Department for 
International Development (DFID, 2010) has also developed an integrated approach 
to state building and peace building which it uses to inform its work in fragile and 
conflict-affected countries. 
DFID’s composite state building for peace framework comprises four key elements 
aimed at strengthening state–society relations through the following inter-related 
objectives: 
Address causes 
and effects of 
conflict and 
fragility 
Support 
inclusive 
political 
settlements 
Develop core 
state 
functions 
Response to 
public 
expectations 
Strong state – society relations 
Figure 1: Building peaceful states and societies
Source: DFID (2010) 
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1. address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility focusing on prevention and 
supporting positive capacities for peace, and build conflict resolution mechanisms; 
2. support inclusive political settlements and processes that can promote more 
inclusive decision making beyond the preserve of elites; 
3. develop core state functions such as security, law, justice, financial and macro-
economic management of the state; and
4. respond to public expectations for jobs and growth, delivery of basic services, 
human rights and democratic processes (DFID, 2010). 
Successful interventions by DFID and other donor organisations in conflict countries 
offers support for the robustness of this model aimed at strengthening state–society 
relations (see Figure 1). This conceptual framework is useful in analysing the 
circumstances of Northern Ireland as a country involved in peace building and 
assessing the causes of fragility in the process thus far.
This paper will argue that although Northern Ireland has been largely successful 
in addressing the causes and effects of the conflict and putting in place inclusive 
political institutions with core state functions such as security, law, justice and macro-
economic management, it has failed to meet public expectations for a ‘peace dividend’ 
from those most affected by the conflict. The paper is organised in four parts – first, 
it examines the fragility of the Northern Ireland peace process to date; second, it 
considers the impact of the strategy deployed by the devolved government to meet 
public expectations for peace, in particular through the Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy; 
third it outlines a new approach, entitled Delivering Social Change, as a framework 
for tackling multi-faceted deprivation problems which thus far appear to have been 
intractable; and finally it reflects on the DFID framework as a conceptual map for 
strengthening state–society relations based on the experience of Northern Ireland.
A fragile peace
Notwithstanding the two major achievements since the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement of political stability and a significant decline in violence, there remains a 
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significant undercurrent of discontent among the most disadvantaged and vulnerable 
in Northern Ireland and questions are asked about what the peace process has meant 
for them. Since many of these communities were in the front line of violence, not 
surprisingly people in these areas expected a better quality of life at the other side of 
a peace process. The fact that this does not appear to have happened may, at least in 
part, explain the fragility of post-conflict Northern Ireland.
This fragility is exemplified in street riots (December 2012) which followed a 
decision by Belfast City Council to limit the number of days the Union flag could 
be flown over the City Hall from 365 to 17 designated days throughout the year. 
Nationalists on the Council had wanted to remove the flag permanently but voted 
in favour of a compromise proposal by the Alliance Party, which holds the balance 
of power, to restrict it to designated days, consistent with practice in Stormont’s 
Parliament Buildings. Riots resulted as 1,500 objectors gathered outside Belfast City 
Hall in protest, followed by violence orchestrated by loyalist paramilitaries and a 
campaign of blocking roads across Northern Ireland. Much of the anger was directed 
towards members of the Alliance Party, several of whom witnessed their properties 
being attacked or, in the case of Naomi Long, MP for East Belfast, received a death 
threat. The fragility of the peace process is also apparent during the traditional 
marching season. In July 2009 riots broke out in North Belfast (Ardoyne) following 
parades by the Orange Orders through nationalist/republican strongholds. Each year 
since then there has been significant violence surrounding contested marching routes 
with the police appealing for a political consensus on parades which has thus far 
been impossible to achieve. As one former Alliance Party leader put it: ‘the war may 
be over but the battle for reconciliation has not even begun’ (Cushnahan, 2012, 14). 
Protestants claim that since the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, republicans 
have engaged in a campaign of stealth to erode their Britishness. Loyalists, in turn, 
feel alienated from the state, an example of which is the police service of Northern 
Ireland, which stands accused of inconsistency in their approach to street protests. These 
assertions has been buoyed up by the release of the 2011 census figures which show an 
increase (since 2001) in the overall Catholic population from 44 to 45% and a decline 
in Protestants from 53 to 48%, the first time the latter are in a minority in terms of 
the overall population, although just one in four of Northern Ireland’s 1.8m people 
sees themselves as exclusively Irish (NISRA, 2012). Unionists cite the disbandment 
of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, successive inquiries into alleged atrocities against 
nationalists during the conflict, former IRA ‘terrorists’ sitting in government and 
restrictions on Orange Order parades as examples of an insidious process to dilute 
their British identity – the issue of the Union flag was merely an extension or a 
tipping point in these developments. The Protestant working class consider itself 
badly served by traditional unionist parties providing little more than voting fodder. 
This is combined with a withdrawal from political activity by the Protestant middle 
class. Some attempts have been made to reinterpret the loyalist tradition through a 
more class-based focus led by community activists which is attempting ‘to organise 
the Protestant working class into a self-conscious political force’ (Cassidy, 2008, 411).
Other factors have fuelled loyalism’s sense of embattlement – as one commentator 
put it ‘the economy has collapsed, leaving working-class Protestants jobless – a 
common refrain is that they cannot afford to visit the new Titanic Centre [a tourist 
attraction in Belfast] even though their grandfathers built the ship’ (Fletcher, 2012, 
3). As business and tourist leaders warn, images of rioting attract international media 
page 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
Northern Ireland: where is the peace dividend?
5
coverage which makes their job of securing inward investment hugely difficult at a 
time when the unemployment rate (December 2012) is 7.8%, and specifically for 
18–24 year olds is 18.9% (Department of Finance and Personnel, 2012). This was 
conveyed by a leader article discussing disorder following the loyalist marches in July 
2012 as follows:
The task of creating new jobs is made more difficult by riots, yet most of 
those in balaclavas are themselves jobless. They come from tough areas; 
their families never placed proper value on education. A dismayingly large 
proportion of young people have trouble reading and writing. But there 
they are, every 12th July, illiterate politically as well as academically, supplying 
dramatic pictures [of Northern Ireland to the media]. (Independent, 2011, 
8)[[not in references, is 2012]]
Education underachievement among the Protestant population is particularly acute. 
From the 10 electoral wards exhibiting lowest levels of education attainment, seven 
are in Protestant working-class areas (Nolan, 2013). Historically, Protestants living in 
these areas attached much less importance to education given their access to traditional 
industries and networks (such as the Orange Order) which facilitated employment 
opportunities. Conversely, the Catholic working class saw education as the route out 
of deprivation. Notwithstanding evidence on education, deprivation data show that 
overall, Catholics experience much greater socio-economic disadvantage. Of the top 
twenty most disadvantaged wards, 16 have a majority Catholic population and, at the 
other end of the scale, only six of the 20 least disadvantaged wards have a Catholic 
majority (Nolan, 2013). The Family Resources Survey (2013) [[not in references]]
shows 22% of Catholics living in households experiencing poverty, compared to 17% 
of Protestants. There are also regional perceptions of disadvantage and discrimination. 
Catholics in Derry/Londonderry, the site of the civil rights movement, some 45 years 
on, feel that Protestant/Unionist ministers have re-routed structural funding (on roads 
and railways) away from the north-east of the Province towards the unionist east.
To add to the fragility of peace on the ground, confidence in the achievements of 
political institutions is low. A public opinion poll for the Belfast Telegraph conducted 
in May 2012 (random sample of 1,267 residents aged 18+) asked respondents the 
following question: ‘Compared to direct rule from Westminster, how would you rate 
the performance of the Northern Ireland Assembly?’ A small percentage (9%) of 
respondents suggested performance was ‘excellent’ (1%) or ‘good’ (8%); 33% stated 
that the Northern Ireland Assembly was making ‘no difference’; and 41% felt that 
performance was ‘poor’ (27%) or ‘very poor’ (14%); and the remainder (17%) expressed 
‘no opinion’. The results were consistent across the religious divide and varied little 
by gender, age or social class. As one commentator pointed out, the question posed 
in the survey ‘sets the bar very low for the main political institution arising from the 
Belfast Agreement of 1998: before the Agreement, direct rule was widely castigated 
for its democratic deficit’ (Wilson, 2012, 33). Devolved government has much to do 
in order to inspire public confidence.
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Where is the peace dividend?
Not surprisingly, given the above, there has been much discussion on the ‘peace 
dividend’ – in other words, what has been the impact of peace on those areas most 
affected by violence and social disadvantage in Northern Ireland? Although there is 
much anecdotal evidence from community organisations operating in working-class 
areas that they have been ‘left behind’, little independent research exists (although see 
Nolan’s work on inequalities, 2012, 79–112).
To capture the extent of the absence of a peace dividend and whether the peace 
process has met public expectations, we first consider data from the Northern 
Ireland Multiple Deprivation Measure (NIMDM). The Northern Ireland Multiple 
Deprivation Measure was first produced in 2001 and used to identify the 10% most 
deprived electoral wards at that time. The NIMDM was updated in 2005 and in 
2010. The 2010 measure comprises seven domains of deprivation, each developed 
to measure a distinct form or type of deprivation, and weighted as follows: income 
deprivation (25%); employment deprivation (25%); health deprivation and disability 
(15%); education skills and training deprivation (15%), proximity to services (10%), 
living environment (5%); and crime and disorder (5%). The deprivation domains 
are constructed from indicators grouped according to the type of deprivation they 
measure. In total 52 indicators were included in the overall multiple deprivation 
measure (NISRA, 2010).
It is not possible to compare the three datasets (2001, 2005 and 2010) to assess 
changes over time because: NIMDM is a relative measure of deprivation and cannot 
be used to assess absolute changes in deprivation; indicators used to make up each 
domain changed; ward boundaries changed; and, population size and demography 
changed over time (Love, 2011). It is, however, possible to consider the rankings of 
the top 10% most deprived wards (n = 56) between the periods 2001 to 2010. Of 
the 56 wards that were ranked in the 10% most deprived wards in 2001, 42 were also 
ranked most deprived in 2010. So in relative terms, 75% of wards which were in the 
top 10% of most deprived in 2001 are still those most disadvantaged areas in 2010. 
To obtain a more detailed picture of changes over time it is possible to consider 
a different unit of analysis than electoral wards (linked to the multiple deprivation 
measure) and build a picture of changes in the quality of people’s lives since the 
political settlement. In June 2003, the government (under Direct Rule Ministers) 
launched a policy document entitled People and place: A strategy for neighbourhood 
renewal. This long-term (10+ years) strategy targeted those communities throughout 
Northern Ireland suffering the highest levels of deprivation. Neighbourhood renewal 
is a cross government strategy, led by the Department for Social Development, and 
aims to bring together the work of all government departments in partnership with 
local people to tackle disadvantage and deprivation in all aspects of everyday life. 
The purpose of the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme was therefore to reduce 
the social and economic inequalities which characterise the most deprived areas. It 
does so by making a long-term commitment to communities to work in partnership 
with them to identify and prioritise needs and co-ordinate interventions designed 
to address the underlying causes of poverty.
The programme had four key elements: 
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•	 community renewal: to develop confident communities that are able and 
committed to improving the quality of life in the most deprived neighbourhoods;
•	 economic renewal: to develop economic activity in the most deprived 
neighbourhoods and connect them to the wider urban economy;
•	 social renewal: to improve social conditions for the people who live in the most 
deprived neighbourhoods through better co-ordinated public services and the 
creation of safer environments;
•	 physical renewal: to help create attractive, safe sustainable environments in the 
most deprived neighbourhoods.
In the seven year period (2003–10) some £140m was spent on the neighbourhood 
renewal programme to improve social, economic and physical conditions. In addition, 
there was £77.5m spend in 2008–11 on urban regeneration projects which included 
the transformation of the City Centre of Derry/Londonderry, the new Peace Bridge 
over the river Foyle, the Belfast Streets Ahead project (implemented to transform 
Belfast City Centre) and major public realm improvements (Northern Ireland 
Executive, 2011, 17). From 2011 onwards there is a £20m recurrent and £6–£8m 
capital funding yearly resource commitment for a four-year period.
These resources were targeted using the following selection process. Neighbourhoods 
in the most deprived 10% of wards across Northern Ireland were identified using the 
multiple deprivation measure discussed above. Following extensive consultation, this 
resulted in a total of 36 areas, and a population of approximately 280,000 (one person 
in six in Northern Ireland), being targeted for intervention. The areas included: 15 
in Belfast; six in the North West (including four in the city of Derry/Londonderry) 
and 15 in other towns and cities across Northern Ireland.
Neighbourhood partnerships were established in each neighbourhood renewal area 
as a vehicle for local planning and implementation. Each neighbourhood partnership 
included representatives of key political, statutory, voluntary, community and private 
sector stakeholders. Together, they developed long-term vision and action plans 
designed to improve the quality of life for those living in neighbourhood renewal areas.
A limited range of data are available which allow us to build a picture of changes 
in the quality of life over time between those living in neighbourhood renewal areas 
(NRAs) and the rest of Northern Ireland (non-NRAs). The basket of indicators 
could be more comprehensive in depicting what constitutes ‘quality of life’ but we 
are limited to the available data over the timeframe relevant to this paper. We have 
chosen six key indicators (in no order of importance) as follows:
•	 Education: the percentage of pupils achieving five GCSEs A*–C grades, including 
English and Maths in the respective areas (neighbourhood renewal areas and 
non-neighbourhood renewal areas)
•	 Social welfare 1: Disability Living Allowance recipients as a percentage of the 
population in the respective areas
•	 Social welfare 2: Jobseeker’s Allowance as a percentage of those eligible to work 
in the respective areas
The Neighbourhood Renewal Programme refers to these two social welfare 
indicators as measures of ‘worklessness’.
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•	 Mental health: suicides per 100,000 population in the respective areas
•	 Health: life expectancy (males) per 100,000 population in the respective areas
•	 Crime: recorded crime (offences) as percentage of the population in respective 
areas.
The data available were limited by collation of information using neighbourhood 
renewal areas as the unit of analysis. Hence the tables of results below[[no tables, 
if this is referring to the figures, best to say, Figures 00 to 00]] were built 
from the Northern Ireland Neighbourhood Information Service (NINIS) database 
held by the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA). In selecting 
these measures we have attempted to be consistent with the outcome indicators for 
the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme which officials categorise as: education, 
worklessness, health and crime (DSD, 2011, 138).
Improved quality of life: evidence
We examine each of the six selected indicators in turn as evidence of an improvement 
in the quality of life or a peace dividend for those living in the most disadvantaged 
areas of Northern Ireland.
Education
Education achievement is a key determinant of life chances and lifetime earnings. 
The indicator: percentage of pupils achieving five GCSEs at A*–C (with English and 
Maths), is seen as being a more accurate measure of educational achievement than 
the equivalent which excludes English and Maths. The Department of Education 
did not disaggregate results in this way until 2007 onwards. An independent-samples 
t-test compared GCSE performance in both areas. There is a significant difference in 
educational attainment for neighbourhood renewal areas (M = 37.13, SD = 2.11) and 
non-neighbourhood renewal areas ([[have added in opening parenthesis – OK?]]
(M = 62.35, SD = 62.35); t (6) = -20.52, p = 0.000 two-tailed). The magnitude of 
the difference in the means (mean difference = -25.22, 95% CI: -28.23 to -22.21) 
is very large (eta squared = 0.98). Therefore 98% of the variance in GCSEs result is 
explained by location, whether one lives in a neighbourhood renewal area or not. The 
data show a marginal increase in education performance over time but less than 1% 
decrease in the educational performance gap between non-neighbourhood renewal 
areas and neighbourhood renewal areas (see Figure 2).
Social Welfare/worklessness 1
Disability Living Allowance (DLA) is a state benefit for those who need help getting 
around and/or looking after oneself because of illness, disability or terminal illness. 
Disability Living Allowance can also be claimed for an ill or disabled child. Disability 
Living Allowance (DLA) is not based on one’s disability but the needs arising from it. 
An independent-samples t-test compared disability allowance claimants in both areas. 
There is a significant difference in the percentage of claimants from neighbourhood 
renewal areas (M = 16.84, SD = 1.32) and non-neighbourhood renewal areas ([[have 
added in opening parenthesis – OK?]](M = 7.72, SD = 1.02); t (26) = 20.38, p 
Figure 2: Percentage of pupils achieving 5 GCSEs (with English and Maths)
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Figure 3: Disability Living Allowance as % of population in respective areas
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= 0.000 two-tailed). The magnitude of the difference in the means (mean difference 
= 9.11, 95% CI: 8.20 to 10.03) is very large (eta squared = 0.94). Therefore 94% 
of the variance in DLA claimants is explained by location, whether one lives in a 
neighbourhood renewal area or not. The data show an increasing number of disability 
allowance claimants in both areas (neighbourhood renewal and non-neighbourhood 
renewal areas) and an expanding social welfare gap from 8.6% to 9.2% over time 
(see Figure 3).
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Figure 4: Job seekers allowance as % of eligible population
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Social Welfare/worklessness 2
Jobseekers allowance is the main benefit for people of working age who are out 
of work or work less than 16 hours per week on average. An independent-samples 
t-test compared job seekers allowance as a proportion of eligible populations in 
both areas. There is a significant difference in the percentage of those claiming job 
seekers allowance for neighbourhood renewal areas (M = 7.36, SD = 1.81) and non-
neighbourhood renewal areas ([[have added in opening parenthesis – OK?]]
(M = 2.88, SD = 0.98); t (22) = 7.53, p = 0.000 two-tailed). The magnitude of 
the difference in the means (mean difference = 4.48, 95% CI: 3.23 to 5.74) is very 
large (eta squared = 0.72). Therefore 72% of the variance in jobseekers claimants is 
explained by location, whether one lives in a neighbourhood renewal area or not. 
The data show an increasing number of job seekers allowance claimants in both areas 
(neighbourhood renewal and non-neighbourhood renewal areas) and an expanding 
social welfare gap from 5.1% to 6.1% over time (see Figure 4).
Mental health
We attempt to capture mental health through the indicator: suicides in respective 
areas, accepting that the causes of suicides can be multiple and complex, not least 
unemployment and poor access to public services which could help vulnerable people. 
Specifically in Northern Ireland, however, the legacy of the conflict could play an 
important part in suicides and the impact of systemic deprivation. Belfast Consultant 
psychiatrist, Philip McGarry, contends that because paramilitary violence remains a 
feature of working-class communities ‘long after’ the Belfast (Good Friday) agreement 
was signed, and the fact that so many young men in those areas have mental health 
problems as a result, is no coincidence (O’Hara, 2011, 3). An independent-samples 
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Figure 5: Suicide rates per 100,000 persons
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t-test compared suicide rates in both areas. There is a significant difference in the 
number of suicides for neighbourhood renewal areas (M = 24.05, SD = 5.64) and 
non-neighbourhood renewal areas ([[have added in opening parenthesis – OK?]]
(M = 11.39, SD = 2.06); t (6) = 4.2, p = 0.006 two-tailed). The magnitude of the 
difference in the means (mean difference = 12.66, 95% CI: 5.32 to 20.01) is very 
large (eta squared = 0.75). Therefore 75% of the variance in suicide is explained by 
location whether one lives in a neighbourhood renewal area or not. The data show 
a sharp increase in the number of suicides in neighbourhood renewal areas and an 
expanding mental health gap from 7.7 to 15.9 suicides per 100,000 persons over 
time (see Figure 5).
Health 
Because health status is a multi-dimensional concept, average lifespan is used as 
an indicator of the average number of years a person can expect to live, if in the 
future they experience the current age-specific mortality rates in the population. 
An independent-samples t-test compared male life expectancy in both areas. There 
is a significant difference in life expectancy between neighbourhood renewal areas 
(M = 71.4, SD = 0.42) and non-neighbourhood renewal areas ([[have added 
in opening parenthesis – OK?]](M = 77.42, SD = 0.65); t (6) = -15.53, p = 
0.000 two-tailed). The magnitude of the difference in the means (mean difference 
= -6.02, 95% CI: -6.95 to -5.07) is very large (eta squared = 0.97). Therefore 97% 
of variance in male life expectancy is explained by location, whether one lives in a 
neighbourhood renewal area or not. The data show that there has been an overall 
increase in life expectancy by 1 year and 1.5 years for males living in neighbourhood 
renewal areas and non-neighbourhood renewal areas respectively. Overall, however, 
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Figure 6: Male life expectancy in years
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males living in neighbourhood renewal areas live six years less than their equivalent 
in non-neighbourhood renewal areas (see Figure 6).
Crime
Recorded crime (offences) data according to the Police Service of Northern Ireland 
(PSNI) are based on an aggregated count of each crime within the notifiable offence 
list. Notifiable offences include all offences that could possibly be tried by jury 
(these include some less serious offences, such as minor theft that would not usually 
be dealt with this way) plus a few additional closely related offences, such as assault 
without injury. Recorded crime figures are used widely within PSNI for management 
information, to monitor performance on crime and detection rate targets against 
the Policing Plan, to inform PSNI policy and to provide information in support 
of operational research identifying appropriate allocation of police resource (PSNI, 
2012). An independent-samples t-test compared recorded crimes in both areas. There 
is a significant difference in the number of recorded crimes between neighbourhood 
renewal areas (M = 14.12, SD = 1.15) and non-neighbourhood renewal areas ([[have 
added in opening parenthesis – OK?]](M = 5.47, SD = 0.78); t (26) = 23.39, p 
= 0.000 two-tailed). The magnitude of the difference in the means (mean difference 
= 8.65, 95% CI: 7.89 to 9.41) was very large (eta squared = 0.95). Therefore 95% 
of the variance in recorded crime is explained by location, whether one lives in a 
neighbourhood renewal area or not. The data show a marginal increase in recorded 
crimes in neighbourhood renewal areas over the period 1998–2011 (+0.61) and 
decrease in non-neighbourhood renewal areas (-0.87). What is important, however, 
is that the gap between recorded crimes in these areas has widened over this period 
(see Figure 7).
In summary, we can conclude that aside from educational performance, the quality 
of life of those living in neighbourhood renewal areas is declining relative to non-
neighbourhood renewal areas as judged by the above indicators. In terms of educational 
performance there has been a marginal improvement since 2007/08 in both NRAs 
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Figure 7: Recorded crime (offences) as % of population in respective areas
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and non-NRAs but less than 1% reduction in the performance gap over that period. 
Disability living allowance recipients has grown in both areas since 1998 and the gap 
in the number of recipients has widened. Those receiving job seekers allowance have 
increased in both areas but the gap has widened by almost 1%. The largest difference 
in NRAs and non-NRAs since 1999 is the number of suicides recorded in the former. 
The difference in life expectancy for males living in NRAs relative to non-NRAs 
continues to increase, some 6.1 years more for those living in the latter. Although there 
has been a decreasing trend in recorded crime (offences) since 1998, the performance 
gap between areas has increased. In short, there has been no peace dividend for those 
living in the most deprived areas of Northern Ireland, in fact their quality of life 
appears to be marginally declining further vis-à-vis their non-NRAs neighbours. It 
is of course true to say that a more comprehensive basket of indicators would help 
to inform this analysis and some of the data (for example, education performance) 
have not been collated in the presented format over a sufficiently long period of time.
Departmental analysis
The Department for Social Development (DSD), the lead department in government, 
which co-ordinated neighbourhood renewal completed an internal mid-term review 
of its People and Place Strategy which monitored progress up until 2008/09 – effectively 
an interim evaluation of the policy to that point (DSD, 2011). The evaluation noted 
that the main aim of the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme was to reduce the 
gap between the most deprived neighbourhood and the rest of the country and 
flagged the importance of being ‘realistic about what the programme has or might 
have achieved’ (DSD, 2011, 3). The report concluded with a number of key findings 
which included:
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•	 While there has been some narrowing of the gap between the neighbourhood 
renewal areas and the rest of Northern Ireland on a range of outcome indicators, 
the areas remain some way behind in both relative and absolute terms.
•	 The Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy has laid the foundations necessary for 
future action.
•	 Given the scale of the problems still remaining in the most deprived areas, the 
regeneration programmes will not be enough on their own to achieve significant 
change (DSD, 2011, 6–7).
The tone and substance of these conclusions suggest that the internal (Department 
for Social Development) evaluators were dampening expectations of narrowing the 
gap between NRAs and non-NRAs. The empirical section in this paper which 
considers the most recent outcome indicators suggests that such pessimism is well 
founded. The internal evaluators expressed concerns about their ‘ability to assess the 
impact of the programme’ more specifically they argued:
There is generally a lack of solid evidence of the overall impact of 
geographically targeted programmes on multiple deprivation. Such evidence 
as there is suggest that the gap between the most deprived areas in Northern 
Ireland and the rest has not closed in any substantial way (and it is likely that 
the most deprived areas are particularly affected by economic downturn). It 
has been suggested that without targeted programmes the gap would have 
widened further. There is a need to understand the impact of programmes 
and to improve understanding of what works. (DSD, 2011, 138)
To be more explicit about what officials imply. The neighbourhood renewal 
programme did not have adequate baseline information, outcome indicators emerged 
or were refined over time and data had to be gathered accordingly, and there is no 
way of attributing positive movement in reducing the gap between the most deprived 
neighbourhoods and the rest of Northern Ireland to the neighbourhood renewal 
programme intervention. What is more difficult to explain is the fact that the original 
paper prepared by the Northern Ireland Assembly, Research and Library Service (Love, 
2011) which tracked some of these indicators has been withdrawn from the official 
website. Could politicians or officials be fearful of what these data would reveal and 
their political sensitivity?
In addition, there were ongoing implementation problems. Some statutory 
organisations did not fully commit to engaging in delivering change through 
neighbourhood renewal. Too much money was expended in supporting the core 
costs of organisations rather than on delivering services and not enough emphasis on 
changing the economic fundamentals of areas as one key way to address deprivation 
is to encourage and support people into employment. There were weaknesses in 
relation to the ability and willingness of some neighbourhood renewal partnerships 
to create radical and deliverable plans, and variation across neighbourhood renewal 
areas in the quality and content of their plans. The Minister for Social Development 
argued that there is ‘patchy participation by some key statutory organisations in some 
local areas; a need to improve the alignment in some areas with other initiatives that 
have an impact on poor health, educational attainment, worklessness and economic 
vitality; and a lack of broad, local political engagement’ (McCausland, 2011). The 
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Department for Social Development has committed, by the end of 2014/15, to 
introduce a successor programme for neighbourhood renewal to tackle deprivation 
and regenerate the most deprived areas of Northern Ireland (DSD, 2012, 10). 
In summary, there are three significant problems emerging from the experience 
of the neighbourhood renewal programme. First, it has proved impossible to secure 
cross-departmental buy-in to a policy which requires not only a commitment across 
government but also a sustained relationship with the voluntary and community 
sectors. Second, after almost 10 years of investment in a relatively stable political 
environment, quality of life indicators have barely shifted or got worse between 
disadvantaged areas and the rest of Northern Ireland. With such limited prospects, 
young people living in these areas feel no sense of commitment or engagement and 
hence are vulnerable to paramilitary influence. For them, there has been no peace 
dividend. Young Protestant unemployed males, in particular, feel abandoned with 
little prospects, and subject to perceived or real threats to their identity. Third, the 
internal evaluators of the programme (officials within the Department for Social 
Development) point out that ‘there is no consistent output monitoring of activities 
and, as a consequence, there is no evidence base of interventions to move from baseline 
to outcomes’ (DSD, 2011, 138). In other words, there is no way of robustly assessing 
the impact of the programme.
A different approach
Given the experiences outlined above of trying to tackle social disadvantage, a new 
initiative entitled Delivering Social Change was launched in March 2012 by the First 
Minister. It seeks to address the lack of co-ordination in tackling cross-departmental 
themes. As the evidence from the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme shows, 
departments tend to operate within functional silos unsuited to public policy issues 
which are multi-faceted in nature. Specifically Delivering Social Change is a delivery 
framework located in the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister 
(OFMDFM) and is designed to tackle multi-generational poverty and to improve 
children’s health, wellbeing, educational and life opportunities. Delivering Social 
Change involves a small number of cross-cutting strategic themes which aim to 
make a significant difference and is additional to existing work within government 
departments.
At the launch of the £26m initiative the First Minister noted: 
The reality is that we cannot continue to address the so-called intractable 
problems of poverty and social inclusion using the methods employed in the 
past. We have too many strategies, too many policies and too many action 
plans, many of which refer to work already proposed or under way and do 
not add real value. The difference with this new approach is that we are not 
interested in producing vast and unwieldy documents for their own sake. 
(Robinson, 2012, 2)
In making a commitment to deliver social change where it is most needed, Ministers 
in OFMDFM identified a number of key challenges that are contributing to the 
continuation of poverty and deprivation. These include: problems with literacy and 
numeracy; the need for parenting support and early development intervention for 
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children; and, lack of employment opportunities coupled with local community 
dereliction. Addressing these severe long-term structural problems Ministers argued, 
required a partnership approach across society including people and communities, 
businesses and wider civic society. In short, Delivering Social Change is about moving 
away from action plans with long lists of existing activities towards smaller numbers 
of cross-cutting and strategic objectives that can make a significant difference and 
are additional to existing work across government.
The government announced (October 2012) six signature projects under this 
initiative (duration two years): additional literacy and numeracy measures; family 
support hubs; positive parenting programmes; social enterprise incubation hubs; 
support for young people not in education, employment and training (NEETs); and, 
nurture units.
Departments come together with strong and visible ministerial leadership to 
deliver these actions through the Delivering Social Change governance structures 
co-ordinated via the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. What is 
important is that there will be a particular focus on outcomes which will assess the 
extent to which projects under Delivering Social Change support the improvement 
of life chances. As the junior Minister in OFMDFM argued:
Delivering Social Change is about delivering projects that are going to make 
a change in people’s lives. Delivering those actions and projects to people on 
the ground will make a change in the quality of their life. (McCann, 2012, 9)
Delivering Social Change is therefore a framework for cross-cutting work which 
is intended to have an impact on the quality of life of the most disadvantaged with 
a specific focus on breaking the long-term cycle of multi-generational poverty. 
What makes it different from the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme is the co-
ordinating role played by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, 
the strength of Ministerial leadership, and a determination to develop an outcomes-
focused model which challenges departments to demonstrate quality of life and life 
chance improvements.
Conclusions
This paper has argued that political stability, a power-sharing devolved administration, 
and the significant decline in violence, have been hugely welcome developments in 
Northern Ireland. It must also be acknowledged that ‘peace’ and stability are still very 
fragile in a society which has emerged from over 30 years of violence. Dissident threats 
remain and seemingly innocuous decisions surrounding the flying of the Union flag 
over public buildings have the potential to trigger widespread street protests and an 
unwelcome return to violence. A dangerous undercurrent of republican violence 
still exists. A group calling itself ‘the IRA’, which is made up of the Real IRA and 
Republican Action against Drugs, joined forces and has claimed responsibility for 
murder and intimidation within their own community. The first political mandate 
following the restoration of devolution (2007–11) has demonstrated the capacity of 
political opponents to share power and work together in coalition, albeit one which 
is dominated by the two largest political parties (DUP and Sinn Féin) much to the 
chagrin of smaller parties who complain of exclusion from key decisions or a political 
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‘carve-up’. Having established its political bona fides the devolved government is now 
expected to tackle some of the most difficult legacy issues from the conflict period 
of which the much vaunted ‘peace dividend’ is one. The evidence from this paper 
suggests that the primary policy vehicle for addressing disadvantage (Neighbourhood 
Renewal Strategy) has met with limited success; in fact, the performance gap on key 
quality of life indicators is widening, not helped by a squeeze on public spending and 
the wider global economic crisis. Notwithstanding these wider contextual pressures, 
fragmented governance appears to have played a major part in the failure to tackle 
cross-cutting issues which have most impact on disadvantaged communities. In an 
effort to break this cycle of multi-generational poverty and social exclusion Delivering 
Social Change has been devised as a framework for integrated service delivery. The 
location of this initiative at the centre of the devolved administration (in OFMDFM) 
and the strength of political leadership and endorsement by Ministers offer the 
prospects for ‘joined-up’ government. Politicians feel the pressure from their electorate 
to move beyond constitutional squabbling and the need to tackle issues which have 
an impact on the quality of people’s lives. Delivering Social Change is their proposed 
way of demonstrating that there is a peace dividend for the most disadvantaged from 
the peace process. 
What lessons are there from the Northern Ireland experience in terms of ‘state 
building for peace’ for other ‘fragile’ post-conflict societies? We return to the DFID’s 
‘building peaceful states and societies’ framework. Evidence from this study would 
suggest that there is the potential to underestimate public expectations in the wake 
of a peace process. Given the protracted nature of the Northern Ireland conflict, the 
euphoria of declining violence and political stability quickly evaporated and heralded 
the prospects of a better life for those most affected by violence. When this didn’t 
happen, disillusionment and a sense of helplessness set in among those who had most 
to gain from peace – communities subjugated by paramilitaries and abandoned by 
government departments, local authorities, health trusts and agencies which have 
clearly failed to deliver key public services. External bodies which supported efforts to 
reach an inclusive political settlement (International Fund for Ireland, European Union 
and Atlantic Philanthropies) now witness a functioning locally elected legislative 
power-sharing Assembly and are in danger of withdrawing – ‘job done’. The DIFD 
framework for building strong state–society relations notes that ‘in fragile contexts, 
public goods may be delivered in a biased and selective manner that helps maintain an 
exclusionary political settlement – addressing this is essential to improve confidence 
in the state and to address grievances’ (DFID, 2010, 32). Somewhat ironically, the 
political structures put in place in Northern Ireland to ensure a consensus (power-
sharing devolved government) actually make it more difficult to respond effectively 
to public expectations for better services and an improved quality of life. The plethora 
of government departments needed to ensure five political parties have seats at the 
Northern Ireland Executive table has resulted in highly fragmented public services 
and a failure to tackle social disadvantage. Consociationalism, put in place to protect 
against any one political group dominating the decision-making process or a reversion 
to majoritarianism, has had public policy consequences through mutual veto exercised 
by the DUP and Sinn Féin. The electorate, in turn, has confirmed the dominance 
of these parties in government. In the last three Northern Ireland elections (2010 
Westminster; 2011 Local Government; and 2011 NI Assembly) the combined voting 
share of the DUP and Sinn Féin has been 50.5%, 52% and 57.7% respectively. This 
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provides a political mandate to maximise one community’s leverage over the other. 
What the Northern Ireland experience shows is that the four elements of DFID’s 
‘state building for peace’ framework: address causes and effects of conflict and fragility; 
support inclusive political settlement; develop core state functions; and, respond to 
public expectations, need to be seen as strongly interconnected, rather than sequential 
which, in the round, strengthen state–society relations. In summary, a failure to respond 
positively to public expectations of peace has contributed significantly to the fragility 
of post-conflict Northern Ireland.
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